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LEGISLATION-CANONS OF CONSTRUCTION-PRESUMPTION OF TERRITORIAL-

ITY-Plaintiff, an American citizen, was employed by defendant contractor to
work on construction in Iraq carried on under a contract with the United States.
Plaintiff brought suit in New York for overtime pay under the Federal Eight
Hour Law1 applying to work done under "Every contract made to which the
United States ... is a party...." A verdict for the plaintiff was upheld by the
New York Court of Appeals. 2 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court,
held, reversed. In absence of contrary intent, legislation is presµmed to apply only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the country. Foley Bros., Inc., v. Filardo, 336
U.S. 281, 69 S.Ct. 575 (1949).
Increasing use of legislative records and other indications of legislative policy
have featured the movement away 'from strict ad1:ierence to the literal meaning of
the words of a statute and from the rigid application of ancient canons.3 But as

40 u.s.c. (1946) §§ 321-326.
Filardo v. Foley Bros., 297 N.Y. 217, 78 N.E. (2d) 480 (1948), reversing 272
App. Div. 446, 71 N.Y.S. (2d) 592 (1947).
3 See Transcontinental & Western Air v. Civil Aeronautics Board, (U;S. 1949) 69
S.Ct. 756; United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 60 S.Ct. 1059 (1940).
1

2
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legislation becomes wider in scope its boundaries become more difficult to define,
and greater are the areas in which there is no ascertainable legislative policy or
intention.4 The problem of a court in such a case is a difficult one. Justice Reed,
however, resolves it easily in the principal case by applying "The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States...." In support of this presumption, the Court cites only Blackmer v.
United States> in which Justice Hughes dismissed the rule as one of construction
rather than power. The presumption was earlier applied by Justice Holmes in
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 6 where he refused to apply the Sherman
Act to alleged monopolistic practices in South America. Basing his decision on
the notions of the conllict of laws that "the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done,"
Holmes concluded that legislation is prima facie territorial. An exception to this
doctrine was spelled out in United States v. Bowman where the rule of interpretation was said not to apply to criminal statutes "not logically dependent on their
locality for the Government's jurisdiction."7 The use of the canon in the principal
case is "based on the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions," rather than upon an analysis of possible factors that should
preclude extra-territorial application. 8 The concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter, however, supplies a far clearer exposition of the administrative and economic difficulties involved in applying the law to foreign work. 9 It would seem
that the validity of the Court's conclusion in this case ought to rest on the weight
of his arguments rather than upon the presumption of territoriality. The eight
hour law appears to have been passed with mixed motives, and without considera4 While the courts and most writers speak of legislative intent and purpose, see Radin,
"Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 863 at 881 (1930): "The 'intent of the legislature' is a futile bit of :fiction." Cf. Landis, "A Note on 'Statutory Interpretation'," 43 HA:s.v.
L. REv. 886 at 892 (1930). Frankfurter warns that "intention" is a "beclouding characterization"; Frankfurter, "Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes," 47 CoL. L. REv.
527 (1947).
5 284 U.S. 421 at 437, 52 S.Ct. 252 (1932); cited in principal case at 285.
s 213 U.S. 347 at 356, 29 S.Ct. 511 (1909). Cf. Ex parte Blair, 12 Ch. D. 522 at
528 (1879).
7260 U.S. 94 at 98, 43 S.Ct. 39 (1922). The presumption has also been applied in
state court decisions refusing out-of-state charities the benefit of local tax exemption laws.
Such cases are based on both a strict construction of tax exemptions and a view of exemptions as a reward for charitable services within the state. In re Robinson's Estate, 138
Neb. 101, 292 N.W. 48 (1940). A few other applications of the presumption may be
found in 2 LEWIS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, §513 (1904). For the
English decisions see RANDALL, BBAL's CARDINAL RuLES OF LEGAL lNTBnPRBTATION 270
(1924).
s Principal case at 285.
9 Id. at 296. Justice Frankfurter relies on the same policy factors that he found in VermilyaBrown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 69 S.Ct. 140 (1948), where he dissented from the
decision applying the Fair Labor Standards Act to leased bases in foreign countries on the
ground that we should not impose domestic standards upon foreign economies. His concurrence in the principal case vigorously attacks the inconsistency of the majority.
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tion of the problem involved in the principal case. 10 While Congress may be
primarily concerned with domestic economic conditions, it would seem that they
are also concerned with government contracts and government work standards
wherever they are performed. Congress categorically applied the eight hour law
to ev~ry government contract. The jurisprudential problem seems clear: what
circumstances justify the exclusion of a particular contract from the scope of
this broad language? The Court will construe a statute to avoid manifest absurdity, or even to avoid an unreasonable result in the light of the legislative purpose.11
In the absence of either absurdity or a clarifying policy, the Court appears faced
with three alternatives. It might apply the act literally; it could reach a result
by application of a canon as categorical as the ''literal meaning" approach;12 or
it may admit that Congress has probably not considered the problem of the
instant case, and then proceed to consider whether particular policy considerations in the light of the act's purpose, should take the case out of the operation
of the act. It is submitted that the majority opinion chooses the most unsatisfactory of the alternatives. The growth of statutory law demands a frank as well
as enlightened jurisprudence. If the scope of the legislative purpose is unascertainable, it would seem better for the Court to openly determine the result upon
·an original determination of policy rather than to arrive silently at a conclusion
and outwardly achieve it by the application of canons. 13

David H. Armstrong, S.Ed.

10 Cf. debates in 23 CoNG. fuc. 5723-5737 (1892); SPERO, GoVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER 77 (1948); Frankfurter, "Hours of Labor and Realism in Constitutional Law," 29
HARv. L. REv. 353 (1916).
11 See Reed, J., in United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534 at 543,
60-S.Ct. 1059 (1940); Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41 at 48,
49 S.Ct. 52 (1928); Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct.
511 (1892).
12 A canon that remedial acts to improve labor conditions should be liberally construed
would lead to a contrary result in the principal case. 3 HoRAcx, SoTHERLAND's STATUTORY
CoNSTROCTION, §7207 (1943).
13 There is little dissent from the statement of Landis: "To condone in these instances
the practice of talking in terms of intent of the legislature • . • when it is apparent that
the intent is that of the judge, is to condone atavistic practices too reminiscent of the
medicine man." Landis, "A Note on 'Statutory Interpretation'," 43 HARV. L. REv. 886 at
891 (1930). See also GRAY, NATURE AND SooncEs OF LAw 165 (1909); Horack, ''In
the Name of Legislative Intention," 38 W. VA. L. Q. 119 at 129 (1932); Pound, "Spurious 'Interpretation," 7 CoL. L. REv. 379 at 381 (1907). Cf. Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 65 S.Ct. 335 (1945).

